has suggested that ambiguity aversion will cause a strict preference for randomization. We show that dynamic consistency implies that individuals will be indi¤erent to ex ante randomizations. On the other hand, it is possible for a dynamically-consistent ambiguity averse preference relation to exhibit a strict preference for some ex post randomizations. We argue that our analysis throws some light on the recent debate about paradoxes for the smooth model of ambiguity. We show that these rest on whether the randomizations implicit in the set-up are viewed as being resolved before or after the (ambiguous) uncertainty.
Introduction
An ambiguous uncertainty is one for which objective probabilities are not available and individuals cannot or do not assign (conventional) subjective probabilities. Ellsberg (1961) argued that individuals would behave di¤erently when faced with ambiguous uncertainties. However, Rai¤a (1961) claimed that individuals can eliminate the e¤ect of ambiguity by randomizing.
Rai¤a' s Argument
We shall illustrate Rai¤a's argument in the context of a slight variant of the 3-colour Ellsberg problem. Consider an urn containing one hundred balls, thirty-three of which are red while the remaining sixty-seven balls are black and yellow in unknown proportions.
(Note that, unlike the standard 3-colour Ellsberg urn, slightly less than one third of the balls are red.) One ball is to be drawn at random from the urn. Let R, (respectively, B or Y ) denote a 'bet' on red (respectively, black or yellow) which pays $100 if a red (respectively, black or yellow) ball is drawn from the urn and $0 otherwise. Furthermore, let R, (respectively, B or Y ) denote a 'bet' against red (respectively, black or yellow) which pays $0 if a red (respectively, black or yellow) ball is drawn from the urn and $100 otherwise.
Reasoning analogous to that of Ellsberg (1961) suggests that many individuals might prefer bets where probabilities are more precisely de…ned and hence display the preferences R B s Y and R B s Y . It is easy to see that there is no subjective probability and no utility which can make these preferences compatible with the subjective expected utility theory (SEU) of Savage (1954) . Rai¤a (1961) argues that an individual can avoid such ambiguity by randomizing.
For instance, in the problem above, making her choice on whether to bet on either a black or a yellow ball being drawn from the urn, conditional on the ‡ip of a 'fair'coin is supposed to remove any ambiguity the individual may perceive. The (overall) probability of winning is 67/200, independent of the actual proportion of black and yellow balls in the urn. Hence, she is facing only conventional risk. This would seem to suggest that ambiguity aversion causes individuals to strictly prefer such a randomization to either of the two pure acts, B or Y , and indeed, since 67=200 > 33=100, to the pure act R as well. That is, the individual would display the preferences
where B fhg Y denotes the 50:50 randomization between B and Y corresponding to the conditional bet: bet on black if the ‡ipped coin comes up heads, otherwise bet on yellow.
As a consequence, if she is allowed to make her bet on the colour of ball drawn the urn conditional on the ‡ip of a 'fair' coin, or, more generally, on the outcome of any 50:50 randomization, then she should not select the act R, the unambiguous pure act. Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) showed that this logic applies to the convex capacity model of ambiguity by Schmeidler (1989) only in the context of the Anscombe-Aumann (henceforth AA) framework, where outcomes are lotteries and so randomizations take place after the realization of the subjectively uncertain state. In this setting, the randomization B fhg Y (denoting the randomizing event by a subscript to emphasize that the randomization takes place after the ball is drawn) corresponds to a two-stage bet in which if the ball drawn from the urn is black (respectively, yellow) the bet pays $100 if the subsequent ‡ip of a fair coin is heads (respectively, tails), otherwise the bet pays nothing.
Hence, the ex post randomization B fhg Y corresponds to her having a …fty percent chance of winning conditional on either a black or a yellow ball being drawn, which yields an overall unambiguous probability of winning of 67=200, no matter what is the composition of black and yellow balls in the urn. Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) also show that in the maxmin expected utility (MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , individuals may (or may not) have a strict preference for randomization. Klibano¤ (2001) presents a preference-based notion of a stochastically independent randomizing device. He shows that this notion is not compatible with representing beliefs by a convex capacity. In his view, this provides a motivation for using MEU rather than CEU. If one accepts this argument, a preference for randomization remains a possibility.
Rai¤a's argument does not appear to make a clear distinction between ex-ante and ex-post randomizations, that is, whether the coin is ‡ipped before or after the ball is drawn from the ambiguous urn. On the one hand, the claim that the individual should ‡ip a coin to determine whether to bet on the red or black ball seems to imply an exante randomization. On the other hand, the claim that the individual faces the same lottery regardless of which ball is drawn, suggests an ex-post randomization is intended.
However it is quite possible that an individual might react di¤erently to ex-ante and ex-post randomizations, Saito (2013) . Although an SEU individual would be indi¤erent between the two, this does not necessarily extend to non-linear preferences.
Ex-Ante versus Ex-Post Randomizations
In this paper we present a model which makes a clear distinction between ex-post and exante randomizations. This is done in a Savage framework with explicit modelling of the timing of randomizations and state uncertainty. We show that dynamic consistency with respect to ex-ante randomizations implies indi¤erence to randomization. The intuition is as follows. Assume the decision maker is initially indi¤erent between a pair of ambiguous acts a and b. Let d be an act formed by taking an ex ante : (1 ) randomization of a and b and suppose that she prefers d to both a and b. Let c be a constant act which is strictly preferred to a and b but is strictly inferior to d. Then before the randomization the individual prefers d to c. However, after she learns the outcome of the randomizing device she will be holding either a or b, both of which she views as inferior to c. This is a clear violation of dynamic consistency.
We believe this is especially intuitive when the result of the randomization is made known to the individual before the resolution of the ambiguous bet. Assume the decision maker dislikes the acts a and b due to ambiguity. We argue that it is implausible that ‡ipping a coin before the uncertainty is resolved will make these acts more attractive.
After the ‡ip, the decision maker remains exposed to either the ambiguous bet a or the ambiguous bet b as determined by the coin.
These di¤erences in preferences about ambiguous acts in the AA and Savage frameworks suggest that the sequence of the realizations of the outcomes of the randomizing device and the states matters. We argued above that Rai¤a (1961) is assuming that the realization of the randomizing device comes …rst. In the AA framework, the randomizations are treated as a mixture of lotteries which take place state-wise and hence, after the realization of states. This point has also been made in a context without ambiguity by Kreps (1988) and, more recently, with ambiguity by Seo (2009) and Wakker (2010 Organization of the paper In the next section we present our framework. Section 3 contains the main results on attitudes to ex-post and ex-ante randomization. We then show in section 4 how they can help shed light on the debate between Epstein (2010) and Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2012) . Our conclusions can be found in Section 5 together with a brief literature review.
Framework and De…nitions
There is a decision maker who faces uncertainty described by a …nite state space S. A generic state is denoted by s. She also has access to a randomizing device with which she may conduct an ex-ante randomization before the state is revealed and/or an ex-post randomization after the state is revealed. It is assumed that the ex-ante and ex-post randomizations are identically and independently distributed. We study whether she would wish to make use of either the ex-ante or ex-post randomization or both. 
Uncertainty and Time
There are three time periods. In the …rst, the outcome of a randomizing device r contained in the sample space R = [0; 1] is revealed. Without essential loss of generality, we assume the outcome of this randomizing device is distributed uniformly over the unit interval.
A risky event is an element of B, the Borel -algebra of subsets of [0; 1], and we let denote Lebesgue measure on B: For each B 2 B, the probability that the realization r of the randomizing device is in the event B, is given by (B). We say an event C 2 B is null if (C) = 0. Let R B denote the set of non-null or relevant events. We assume that all randomizations are conditional on non-null events. In the second time period, a possibly ambiguous state, s 2 S, is revealed. Finally the outcome of a randomization device, identically and independently distributed to the …rst, t 2 T is realised in the third time period.
The grand state space is a Cartesian product = R S T . This is a complete description of how all uncertainty is resolved. Once r, s and t are known there is no further uncertainty. This framework allows us to distinguish between ex-ante and expost randomizations.
The space, X, of outcomes is a connected subset of R. An act is function, a : ! X.
(For simplicity, we assume that the pay-o¤s of acts are expressed in utility terms.) The set of all acts is denoted by A ( ). The decision maker has preferences represented by a binary relation, %, on A ( ), which we take to be complete, re ‡exive and transitive.
A constant act is one which assigns the same outcome x 2 X, to every triple (r; s; t)
in . Let A (R), A (S) and A (T ) be the subsets of A ( ), given by A (R) = a 2 A ( ) : 8r 2 R; 8ŝ;s 2 S; 8t;t 2 T; a r;ŝ;t = a r;s;t ;
A (S) = a 2 A ( ) : 8r;r 2 R; 8s 2 S; 8t;t 2 T; a r; s;t = a r; s;t ;
and A (T ) = fa 2 A ( ) : 8r;r 2 R; 8ŝ;s 2 S; 8t 2 T; a (r;ŝ; t) = a (r;s; t)g :
The acts in A (S) only depend on the resolution of the state uncertainty and are independent of the outcomes of the two randomizations. These are the acts in which the decision-maker is primarily interested. The randomizing devices are only present to help him/her if required. We shall denote generic elements of A (S) by f; g; h (alluding to Savage acts that involve only the resolution of purely subjective uncertainty). When convenient we shall abbreviate f (r; s; t) to f (s), for f 2 A (S) :
We shall denote generic elements of A (R) by`;~;^and generic elements of A (T ) by ;~ ;^ (alluding to lotteries with 'objective'probabilities) and again when convenient we shall abbreviate`(r; s; t) to`(r) for any`2 A (R) and (r; s; t) to (t) for 2 A (T ).
Randomization
In this section we de…ne ex-ante and ex-post randomizations. We then proceed to describe the related concept of a subjective mixture of two Savage acts. We de…ne ex-ante randomization as follows.
The act f C g is an ex-ante randomization between the subjectively uncertain acts f and g. This is the type of randomization considered by Rai¤a (1961) . If the resolution of R were to be made known before the resolution of S then f C g could be viewed as a contingent plan in which the act f is chosen if the randomizing device selects an element of C and the act g is chosen otherwise. Analogously one may de…ne an ex-post randomization.
Attitudes towards randomization are de…ned as follows.
3 Note that ex-post randomizations in this framework may be identi…ed with a subset of the horseracelottery acts in the AA framework. In particular, the ex-post randomization f D g may be identi…ed with a the horserace-lottery act H where for each s in S,
and x is the degenerate lottery that yields the outcome x with probability 1. That is, an ex-post randomization can be naturally identi…ed with an horserace-lottery act in which the second stage is a binary lottery. De…nition 2.3 (Preference for randomization) An individual exhibits a strict preference for some form of ex-ante (resp. ex-post) randomization if there exists C 2 R, such that (C) 2 (0; 1), and 9f ,g 2 A (S) such that f s g and f C g f , (resp. f C g f ).
De…nition 2.4 (Indi¤erence to randomization) An individual is indi¤erent to exante (resp. ex-post) randomization if for all C 2 R, such that (C) 2 (0; 1), and all f ,g
We require that indi¤erence to randomization applies to all f; g such that f s g:
In contrast, in the de…nition of strict preference for randomization we only require that there exist f; g such that the strict preference holds. The reason for this is that the Rai¤a argument for randomization only applies to complementary acts such as betting on the red or black balls from the same Ellsberg urn. Rai¤a's intuition does not obviously apply to non-complementary acts such as betting on the black balls from two di¤erent Ellsberg urns.
For any`2 A (R), let F`: X ! [0; 1] denote the cumulative distribution function associated with this lottery. That is, for any x 2 X, F`(x) = (fr 2 R :`(r) 6 xg).
Similarly, for any 2 A (T ), let F : X ! [0; 1] denote the cumulative distribution function associated with .
We maintain throughout the analysis that the decision maker does not discriminate between lotteries over certain outcomes, which have the same cumulative distribution function, whether they are resolved before or after the subjective uncertainty. 4 This is captured in the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1 (Distribution Invariance)
1. For any`2 A (R) and any 2 A (T ), F`= F )` ; 2. if a; b 2 A ( ) are such that 8r 2 R, 8s 2 S, F a(r;s; ) = F b(r;s; ) then a s b:
5 Notice in particular, part 2 of distribution invariance implies that for any pair of
Given the transitivity of indi¤erence, it also readily follows that for any pair of lotteries`;~2 A (R), if F`= F~then` ~. Hence preferences are independent of the particular randomizing device used. Thus a gamble which pays $100 if a fair coin shows heads, $30 otherwise; is viewed as equivalent to a gamble which pays $100 if a fair die comes up 4, 5 or 6 and $0 otherwise. 6 We de…ne a subjective mixture of two acts as follows.
De…nition 2.5 (Subjective mixture of acts) For any pair f , g 2 A(S) and E S, the subjective mixture of f and g; is an act f Eg 2 A (S) de…ned by f Eg (s) = f (s) if
Thus the subjective mixture of f and g coincides with f if s is in the uncertain event E and coincides with g otherwise. We say an event E S is null if gEf f for all f; g 2 A (S). Let N denote the set of null subsets of S.
Assumptions 2.3.1 Dynamic Consistency
We assume that in addition to the unconditional preference % on A ( ), there is, for all (non-null) events C 2 R, a conditional preference % C de…ned on A ( ). We say preferences are dynamically consistent with respect to the ex-ante randomization if the following holds.
Assumption 2.2 (R-dynamic consistency) For any relevant event C 2 R :
(ii) if (C) < 1, then for any pair of acts a; b 2 A ( ): a % C b and a % RnC b implies
6 This assumption is similar in spirit to the device independence assumption in Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) . Part (i) of R-dynamic consistency says that if C is sure to occur then the conditional preference should be the same as the unconditional preference. As is standard, part (ii) of R-dynamic consistency says that an individual who conditionally expresses a preference between two acts whether or not the randomization based on R yields a realization in the event C, should also unconditionally express that preference. This is a weak dynamic consistency axiom since it only requires consistency after observing a non-null event of R:
The next assumption states that preferences over ex-ante randomizations satisfy a weak version of consequentialism.
Assumption 2.3 (R-consequentialism) For any C 2 R and any f; g 2 A (S),
This assumption requires that the conditional preference % C only depends on the outcomes in C S T . Hence R-consequentialism may be viewed as a weak version of consequentialism in the sense that it only applies to events de…ned by the ex ante randomizing device. In particular it does not exclude possible violations of consequentialism due to ambiguity.
The Randomizing Devices
Next is our assumption, which captures a notion that the ex-ante randomizing is independent of the process determining which state s 2 S obtains and is also independent of the ex-post randomizing device.
Assumption 2.4 (R-independent randomizations) For any relevant event C 2 R, and any f; g 2 A (S), f % g , f % C g.
In our opinion, the key features of an independent randomizing device are that its output conveys no useful information about the likelihood of the states and that the decision maker does not care directly about the outcome of the device. We believe that for acts which only depend on the S states, preferences conditional on events de…ned by the randomizing device should coincide with the unconditional preference.
It is logically possible that preferences might depend directly on the outcome of the randomizing device even though it is independent of the state-uncertainty. For instance an individual may be more willing to accept an ambiguous risk if her lucky number comes up.
The Machina's Mom example, concerning the allocation of an indivisible treat, is another case where the conditional preference may depend on the outcome of an independent randomizing device, see Machina (1989) . The R-independent randomizations assumption rules out such preferences.
Ambiguity-Aversion
The following assumption says that the decision-maker is ambiguity-averse in the sense that there is at least one occasion in which (s)he expresses the usual preferences in the two-ball Ellsberg paradox. and some pair of outcomes x y,
x C y y C x xEy yEx.
Notice that the indi¤erences xEy yEx and x C y y C x for some x y , suggests the decision maker views both the events R E T and R S C as equally likely as their respective complements. If the decision-maker were probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) this would require an indi¤erence between the act xEy and the lottery x C y. Instead the lack of indi¤erence indicates a strict preference of the decision maker to prefer the two-outcome symmetric lottery rather than two-outcome symmetric Savage acts. Our main motivation is to study ex-ante randomizations with known probabilities, which is the case suggested in Rai¤a (1961). The dynamic information structure is clearly spelled out in Rai¤a's thought experiment.
Our …rst result says that it cannot be the case that the decision-maker always prefers randomizations. If f and g are indi¤erent and some randomizations are preferred to the pure acts there must be other ex-ante randomizations which are not superior to the pure acts.
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Proposition 3.1 Let % , % C : C 2 R be a family of conditional preference orders that satis…es R-dynamic consistency (2.2) and R-consequentialism (2.4). Consider a given event C 2 R and two acts f; g 2 A (S) such that f s g, if
Suppose the randomizing device is a fair coin, hence R = fr 1 ; r 2 g ; where r 1 and r 2 are equally likely. 10 The spirit of the Rai¤a argument seems to suggest that if f; g 2 A (S) are ambiguous bets on complementary events such that f s g then f r 1 g f and f r 2 g f:
8 This may be viewed as a special case of 'issue preference' (as in Ergin and Gul (2009)) or 'source dependence'(as in Chew and Sagi (2008)) 9 One may …nd this result less compelling in a normative sense than a strict preference which violates dynamic consistency. If preferences satisfy an appropriate continuity property, however, then we can construct a violation of dynamic consistency which only involves strict preferences. The argument in the introduction provides an outline of the proof. 10 This can be made compatible with our assumption that the R-space is a continuum by identifying r 1 with 0; In other words both 'f if heads g if tails'and 'f if tails g if heads'are preferred to f: The above result shows that such preferences are not possible and indeed the decision-maker must be indi¤erent to all 50:50 randomizations. More generally it is not possible to have a strict preference for ex-ante randomization and distribution invariance at the same time, that is, Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 imply indi¤erence to randomization.
Proposition 3.1 does not make use of R-independent randomizations, (2.4). If we add this to our previous assumptions we can deduce that preferences must exhibit indi¤erence to randomization.
Proposition 3.2 Let %; % C : C 2 R be a family of conditional preference orders that satis…es R-dynamic consistency (2.2), R-consequentialism (2.3) and R-independent randomizations (2.4). Then the unconditional preference order % must be indi¤erent to R-randomization.
Proof. Fix a pair of acts f; g 2 A (S) such that f g and a C 2 R. Then f
and f C g RnC f then by R-dynamic consistency f C g f . Hence we have shown f s g implies f C g f for all non-null C $ R, and thus % is indi¤erent to randomization.
The proof does not use the full strength of the dynamic consistency assumption but only applies it to indi¤erences. Proposition 3.2 does not assume beliefs over the S-space are ambiguous. Hence it also applies to some non-expected utility preferences which are probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) . Its proof also does not exploit the fact that beliefs about the randomizing device are additive (and that the preferences satisfy Distribution Invariance (A. 2.1)). Hence even if an ambiguous randomizing device is available, the decision maker would not wish to use it. 
Ex-post Randomization
In this section we show Ellsberg Ambiguity-Aversion (A.2.5) and Distribution Invariance (A.2.1) imply a strict preference for ex-post randomization. Suppose that one takes a randomization over AA acts as a state-wise randomization over the outcome lotteries, as almost all of the literature does. Then ambiguity-aversion implies that there exist ex-post randomizations that are preferred to the ambiguous act itself. In particular, a decision maker who prefers to bet on the unambiguous urn as described in Ellsberg's two-colour urn (Ellsberg (1961) ) will prefer some ex-post randomization.
As the next proposition shows, in conjunction with Distribution Invariance, such an individual will exhibit a strict preference for some ex-post randomization over some pairs of acts in A (S).
Proposition 3.3 Let % be a preference on A ( ) that satis…es Assumptions 2.1 (distribution invariance) and 2.5 (Ellsberg ambiguity-aversion). Then there exists a relevant event D 2 R, and a pair of acts f and g in A (S), such that f D g f g.
Proof. Since the agent is Ellsberg ambiguity-averse there exists an event C 2 R with
and a non-null event E = 2 N , and some pair of outcomes x y, such that x C y y C x xEy yEx. Set f := xEy and g := yEx. Consider the ex post randomization f C g :
By applying Assumption 2.1, it follows that
Theoretical arguments based on hedging between complementary acts imply that individuals are likely to have a strict preference for ex-post randomization, Schmeidler (1989) .
It is an empirical question whether people will actually prefer ex-post randomizations.
Multiple Priors
This section contains an example of preferences which satisfy R-dynamic consistency, Rconsequentialism and Ellsberg Ambiguity Aversion. They exhibit indi¤erence to ex-ante randomization but a strict preference for ex-post randomization. The preferences in the example have the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) form. MEU is de…ned below.
De…nition 3.1 We say that a preference relation % on A ( ) is Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) if there exists a closed convex set of probability distributions, P, on such that preferences may be represented by the function
Furthermore, if for each p 2 P, we write p R for its marginal distribution on R and p ( j )
for the distribution on S T conditional on the realization r, then we say P satis…es the rectangularity property of Epstein and Schneider (2003) with respect to the ex ante randomization, if
a (r; s; t) dp 0 (s; tjr) dp R (r)
Example 3.1 Suppose R = fr 1 ; r 2 g with (r 1 ) = (r 2 ) = 1 2
; S = fs 1 ; s 2 g ; T = ft 1 ; t 2 g and (t 1 ) = (t 2 ) = 1 2
; where (resp. ) denotes the probability of the ex-ante (resp. ex-post) randomizing device. This models a situation where the ex-post and ex-ante randomizing devices are independent tosses of a fair coin. De…ne Q (S T ) by Q = fq 2 (S T ) : q(s 1 ; t) = 1 4 2 ; q(s 2 ; t) = 1 4 + 2 : g:
Let the decision-maker's set of priors be given by: P = fp 2 ( ) : p (r; s; t) = (r) q r (s; t) : q r 2 Qg :
By construction, the set is rectangular with respect to the partition de…ned by the ex-ante randomization, i.e. r 1 S T; r 2 S T . As the following result shows these preferences satisfy our axioms, thus, inter alia, demonstrating that they are consistent.
Proposition 3.4 If the DM has MEU preferences with beliefs represented by P then he will satisfy R-dynamic consistency (A.2.2) R-consequentialism (A.2.3) and Ellsberg
Ambiguity-Aversion (A.2.5). He will be indi¤erent to ex-ante randomization but will have a strict preference for ex-post randomization.
Proof. De…ne acts a; b 2 A (S) by:
a (r; s; t) = 8 > < > :
b (r; s; t) = 8 > < > :
Letp denote a typical element of P: By constructionp has the form p (r; s; t) = + 2 if hs; ti = hs 2 ; t 1 i or hs 2 ; t 2 i ; for r 2 fr 1 ; r 2 g :
The expected value of a with respect top is Epa =p (r 1 ; s 1 ; t 1 ) +p (r 2 ; s 1 ; t 1 ) +p (r 1 ; s 1 ; t 2 ) +p (r 1 ; s 1 ; t 2 ) = ; hence a s b:
Preferences for ex-Post Randomization and Ellsberg Ambiguity Aversion Let C denote the event t = t 1 ; and let E denote the event s = s 1 : Consider the ex-post randomization a C b; then a C b (r; s 1 ; t 1 ) = a C b (r; s 2 ; t 2 ) = 1 and a C b = 0 otherwise.
Thus Epa C b =p (r 1 ; s 1 ; t 1 ) +p (r 2 ; s 1 ; t 1 ) +p (r 1 ; s 2 ; t 2 ) +p (r 1 ; s 2 ; t 2 ) = ; (recallp denotes a generic element of P).
: Hence the individual displays a strict preference for ex-post randomization. Since for x y; x C y s y C x xEy s yEx; Ellsberg ambiguity aversion is also satis…ed.
Indi¤erence to ex-Ante Randomization Consider the ex-ante randomization a r 1 b:
Then a r 1 b (r 1 ; s 1 ; t) = a r 1 b (r 2 ; s 2 ; t) = 1 and a r 1 b = 0 otherwise. As before letp denote a generic element of P: Thenp (r 1 ; s 1 ; t 1 ) =p (r 1 ; s 1 ; t 2 ) = 
: min q r 2 2Q E p a r 1 b (r 2 ; s; t) :
, the individual is indi¤erent to ex-ante randomisation.
R-Dynamic Consistency These preferences are rectangular with respect to the partition created by the ex-ante randomizing device. Thus by Epstein and Schneider (2003) they satisfy R-dynamic consistency.
R-Consequentialism R-Consequentialism is clearly satis…ed because the de…nition of the conditional preferences makes no reference to outcomes in other states. Consider the event fr 1 g, (for convenience we abbreviate fr 1 g S T to fr 1 g). The set of updates of P conditional on fr 1 g is Q. Conditional preferences are de…ned by:
By inspection, preferences are independent of outcomes on the complement of fr 1 g : By similar reasoning we can show that preferences conditional on fr 2 g are consequentialist.
It can be seen that this construction generalizes. Take a set of multiple prior preferences over S T which give a strict preference for ex-post randomisation. Then extend them by imposing rectangularity with respect to the partition created by the ex-ante randomizing device. The result will be a set of preferences which satis…es the axioms.
Thus a large class of multiple prior preferences is compatible with our framework.
Paradox for the Smooth Ambiguity Model
Epstein (2010) provides examples of acts for which the intuitive ranking is incompatible with the representation by the smooth model proposed by Klibano¤, Marinacci, and
Mukerji (2005), (henceforth KKM). In response KKM have o¤ered their own intuition for a di¤erent ranking of the same acts. We believe that making a distinction between ex-ante and ex-post randomizations can clarify some of the issues in this debate.
Epstein's argument involves a toss of a fair coin. He does not specify whether this is to be interpreted as an ex-ante or an ex-post randomization. To accommodate this we use the symbol to denote a 50:50 randomization without specifying whether it is ex-post or ex-ante. Thus denotes randomization which yields (resp. ) if the coin shows heads (resp. tails). In terms of our notation, Epstein's thought experiment may be expressed as follows.
Example 4.1 (Epstein (2010) ) You are given two urns, numbered 1 and 2, each containing 50 balls that are either black or white. You are told also that the two are generated independently, for example, they are set up by administrators from opposite sides of the planet who have never been in contact with one another. One ball will be drawn from each urn. In addition there is a fair coin which can come up either heads or tails:
Consider the following actsf (resp.f ) is a bet on the event that a black ball will be drawn from urn 1 (resp. 2),f f is an act which selectsf if the coin comes up heads andf if tails; g is a bet on the event that a white ball will be drawn from urn 1: Finallŷ a (resp.ã) is a randomization which selectsf (resp.f ) if the coin shows heads and g otherwise.
To interpret this in our framework assume that the ex-ante and ex-post randomizations are independent tosses of a fair coin. Let R = fr 1 ; r 2 g and T = ft 1 ; t 2 g ; where r 1 denotes the event that the ex-ante coin shows heads etc. The grand state space is = R S T , where S = fb 1 ; w 1 g fb 2 ; w 2 g. The colour of the ball drawn from the …rst (respectively, second) urn is denoted by s 1 2 fb 1 ; w 1 g (respectively, s 2 2 fb 2 ; w 2 g).
The various acts from Epstein's thought experiment may be represented as follows: In the quotation, the notation of events and acts has been adapted to the one used in this paper. 13 As in the previous quotation, we have adapted the notation to the one used in this paper.
depends on the colour compositions of both urns, but has half the exposure to the uncertainty about the ratio in each urn compared tof andf . Recall that the determination of the two urn compositions is viewed as independent.
The actf f f thus diversi…es the individual's exposure across the urns: it provides a hedging of the two independent ambiguities in the same sense as diversifying across bets on independent risks provides a hedging of the risks.
To an individual who is averse to ambiguity (i.e., to subjective uncertainty about relative likelihoods), such diversi…cation is naturally valuable."
Epstein's argument that the indi¤erence between f andf cannot be improved upon by a randomization because "the compositions of the two urns are unrelated" suggests that he views the randomization as occurring ex-ante, i.e.f f =f fhgf in our notation.
In contrast, the hedging argument of Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji refers explicitly to the (ex-post) equivalence of the 'lottery' outcomes x y and y x in states (b; w)
and (w; b), respectively, achieved by the 'randomization'. This suggest that they view the randomizationf f as occurring ex-post, in our notationf f is equal tof ft 1 gf .
In combination with our analysis, this example shows that the smooth model can accommodate ex-post randomizations, however it appears to have di¢ culties with ex-ante randomizations.
Conclusion

Related Literature
Much of the recent literature in this area is not directly comparable since they tend to use the AA model while we use a Savage framework. 14 We made this modelling choice since we believe that when studying attitudes to randomization it is important to model the randomizing device in the same way as other uncertainties. Kuzmics (2013) argues that if a rational individual is ambiguity-averse, it will not be possible to demonstrate his/her ambiguity aversion experimentally. The paper starts by assuming a preference for ex-post randomization induced by hedging complementary acts. The AA axiom on reversal of order of randomization is then invoked to deduce a strict preference for ex-ante randomization. An extension to the basic argument shows that even asking subjects a …nite sequence of questions is not capable of distinguishing ambiguity-averse and SEU preferences.
Kuzmics
There are a number of di¤erences between his theoretical framework and that in the present paper. Firstly he assumes that individuals are committed to their randomizations. This is reminiscent of our distinction between ex-ante and ex-post randomizations. An ex-post randomization embodies a form of commitment, since it is not possible to change actions after the randomization. Secondly the paper uses an AA framework. This involves making a particular modelling choice about which uncertainties are modelled using the state space and which are modelled by the AA scaling probabilities. It is not clear that the same result could be obtained with a di¤erent modelling choice.
We shall argue that the crucial assumption is the reversal of order of randomizations.
One might note …rst that none of the standard theories of ambiguity-aversion satisfy this assumption. As already noted, the spaces of ex-ante and ex-post randomizations are di¤erent mathematical objects. There is therefore no compelling reason to impose indi¤erence between them.
Bade
Bade (2011b) has a related argument concerning experiments on ambiguity-aversion. She argues that subjects may use randomizing devices, which are part of the experimental design, to reduce their exposure to ambiguity. As a result the experiment may understate actual ambiguity-aversion. An example of such a randomizing device would be the commonly used Becker-de Groot-Marshak mechanism.
which is selected randomly for payment. The question Bade asks is whether subjects will make the same answer as in a situation where they faced a single question for certain. It is well known that the answer is yes for expected utility preferences but no for some common types of non-expected utility preferences, Karni and Safra (1987) . Bade investigates how these results can be extended to a class of ambiguity-averse preferences.
This is related to the question studied in the present paper. Consider the variant of the one-urn Ellsberg problem from the introduction. Recall R (respectively, B or Y ) denotes the bet that pays $100 if a red (respectively, black or yellow) ball is drawn from the urn.
Then an ambiguity-averse individual who has a strict preference for randomization may well have the preference
where as before h denotes the event that a fair coin shows heads when tossed and B fhg Y denotes the act which pays o¤ on B (resp. Y ) if the coin shows heads (resp. tails). Thus the subject prefers R to B and R to Y . However if (s)he is asked to express a preference in both these situations and told that one of these choices will be played out for real with probability 1 2 then choosing B in the …rst choice and Y in the second is equivalent to choosing B fhg Y which is strictly preferred to R. Hence the subject will express the opposite choices in the situation where one decision is randomly played for real, compared to the situation in which (s)he was asked either question in isolation. Thus in experiments on ambiguity it is necessary to be careful when introducing extra uncertainty.
Bade does not explicitly model the timing of randomizations. Our results suggest that if an explicit temporal structure is imposed on her model the distortion of preferences would arise with ex-post randomizations. It may be the case that subjects are not told the order of resolution of uncertainty. In this case the result would depend on the subjects' belief about whether the randomizations were ex-post or ex-ante.
Saito
Saito (2013) characterizes preference for randomization in terms of preferences over sets of acts. In his model there is a single randomization. The subject is not told whether the randomization occurs ex-ante or ex-post. Hence they must then form subjective beliefs about the timing of the randomization. Saito axiomatizes preferences which depend on a parameter which re ‡ects subjective beliefs as to whether the randomization is ex-post or ex-ante.
Final Comments
This paper studies the Rai¤a argument for randomization as a response to ambiguity. It shows that preferences which are not indi¤erent to randomization must be dynamically inconsistent. If one views dynamic consistency as a fundamental normative principle, then these results suggest there is no normative theory of ambiguity aversion in which there is a strict preference for randomization.
From the descriptive point of view there is little evidence that experimental subjects are dynamically consistent. Thus there is no logical reason why one cannot assume strict preference for randomization in a descriptive theory. However the experimental evidence does not suggest that individuals express a strict preference for ex-ante randomization, Dominiak and Schnedler (2011) . There is also evidence against a preference for expost randomization, see Eichberger, Oechssler, and Schnedler (2012) . Reconciling these experimental results with the theory is a topic for future research.
The preference for randomization argument is most plausible when applied to problems of balls and urns. In an experiment like the 2-ball Ellsberg urn it is reasonably clear that betting on red is a complementary act to betting on black. In real ambiguous decisions there are often no easily available acts which pay-o¤ in the complementary events.
Consider, for instance, decisions such as whether it is worth paying a large amount of money to protect against an uncertain environmental threat or whether to invade a rogue state which may have weapons of mass destruction. In such cases randomization is not obviously attractive. Ball and urn experiments capture some aspects of reality. However they also leave important things out.
In the convex capacity model it is not possible to have a strict preference for randomization. In more general models of ambiguity, such as multiple priors, one may or may not have a strict preference for randomization. Both preferences are possible, and which one uses is a modelling choice. We anticipate that some researchers will continue to assume a strict preference for randomization. The price of doing so is dynamic inconsistency.
